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ABSTRACT 
A series of examples of computational models is 
provided, where the model aim is to interpret numerical 
results in terms of internal states of agents’ minds. Two 
opposite strategies or research can be distinguished in 
the literature. First is to reproduce the richness and 
complexity of real world as faithfully as possible, 
second is to apply simple assumptions and check the 
results in depth. As a rule, the results of the latter 
method agree only qualitatively with some stylized 
facts.  The price we pay for more detailed predictions 
within the former method is that consequences of the 
rich set of underlying assumptions remain unchecked.  
Here we argue that for computational reasons, complex 
models with many parameters are less suitable. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the times of Max Weber, social scientists agree 
that mere external observations do not provide sufficient 
information to understand human actions. Beliefs, 
expectations, emotions and norms play a major role 
there and should enter to theories and models. On the 
other hand, these internal properties cannot be measured 
directly; information on these variables can be collected 
by interviews, and the relation between the interview 
results and the internal properties remains at best subtle.  
 
The aim of this text is to highlight the connection 
between emotional and behavioral aspects in selected 
computational models of states of mind. As a rule, these 
models are postulated with the aim to interpret some 
observed effects; a successful model should also suggest 
the way to refine methods of research. If a model does 
not offer any contact with reality, it deserves to be 
described with the Pauli’s famous statement “not even 
wrong”.  
 
It is obvious that a model with more parameters allows 
to reproduce observed data with more details. In our 
view, this option is a dangerous temptation; we argue 
that, paradoxically, models with more internal 
parameters are less suitable to infer about internal 
variables. Our argumentation is directed against models, 
which intend to capture reality by fitting parameters. 
This procedure is well established in physics; also in 
mathematics we sometimes determine unknown 
parameters from the condition of existence of a 
nontrivial solution. On the contrary, in social sciences 
parameters can be fixed only rarely. Even if so, their 
values fluctuate from one society to another, from one 
time instant to another. It is not sufficient, therefore, to 
demonstrate that this or that social effect can be 
reproduced within a given model. We should check how 
our model works for the parameter values taken from 
some ranges, justified by the model context; only then 
we keep control of the model outcome. The procedure, 
known as the sensitivity analysis, is hard to be applied 
for purely computational reasons if the number K of 
parameters is large; the number of program runs 
increases exponentially with K. Consequently, the 
analysis of the results is more likely to remain 
superficial. 
  
MESSAGE RECEIPT 
 
The first story to bring up here is a method proposed to 
unify two earlier approaches of public opinion (Zaller 
1992; Deffuant et al. 2000; Kulakowski 2009). Actually, 
both models (Zaller 1992; Deffuant et al. 2000) readily 
apply to the more general problem of social 
communication. The Zaller book provides an extended 
frame of analysis of social receipt of messages, as 
dependent on their content and on individual 
characteristics of recipients. At the core of this frame, a 
multidimensional parameterization was developed, with 
separate parameters related to the credibility of the 
message, the awareness on resistance to persuasion, the 
predisposition on resistance to persuasion, the message 
intensity, the strength of a relationship between 
awareness and reception and some others. This kind of 
modeling aims to refer to individual emotional 
predispositions of the message recipient, related to 
particular messages. As the outcome of the 
mathematical formulas, we get the probabilities that the 
recipient receives and accepts a given message or 
simply ignores it. Then, these probabilities allow to 
infer on the recipient's behavior: a reaction triggered by 
the message or lack of it.  
 
A general problem encountered with multidimensional 
  
parameterizations is that the sensitivity analysis cannot 
be performed. With ten parameters and only three trial 
values of each (large, small, medium) there is already 
almost 60 thousands model results to be analyzed. What 
is even more important here, the number of parameters 
should be smaller than the number of calculated 
outcomes; otherwise the model is reduced to a 
parameterization, which allows to encode potentially 
each expected/demanded result in the input. More about 
principles of social modeling can be found in (Edmonds 
2000; Edmonds 2005; Helbing and Balietti 2011). 
 
The Deffuant model and its later extension seem to be a 
remedy to the problem of many parameters. The model 
(Deffuant et al. 2000) explores the concept termed 
'bounded confidence', what – in a broad sense - means 
that people ignore opinions, messages and other persons 
which and who are more distant, than some prescribed 
threshold. In this way, the idea of distance is introduced 
to psychological and social considerations. This idea, 
although it can seem trivial for a physically oriented 
mind, brings two specific properties: first, it is 
expressed in numbers, and second, it fulfills the so-
called triangle inequality. The latter means that the 
distance between two objects, say A and B, is not 
greater than the distance between A and C plus the 
distance between B and C; this should be true for any 
object C. This inequality, basic for Euclidean geometry, 
has never been proved in relations  to social sciences; on 
the contrary, it is possible to break it, what is known as 
intransitive preference (Noteboom 1984). It appears that 
the introduction of distance is a strong condition which 
allows to reduce the number of parameters to one or 
two. Although as arbitrary as the Zaller 
parameterization, it makes the model of social 
communication much simpler. 
 
In the unified version (Kulakowski 2009) of the Zaller-
Deffuant model, points in a planar area represented 
messages on two basic issues, say safety and welfare. 
Agents' knowledge and experience with respect to these 
issues were growing, as the agents were able to receive 
messages which were not too far from  messages 
received previously. The threshold distance from a 
previously received message to a newly accepted, 
although far, one, represented the mental ability of an 
agent in the unified model. The basic result of  
(Kulakowski 2009; Malarz et al. 2011; Malarz and 
Kulakowski, 2012)  is that agents with smaller abilities 
are more prone to extreme opinions. Apparently, this 
result does not depend on the choice of the threshold 
value. In this way, the difficulty of the multidimensional 
parameterization is evaded. 
 
Above we noted that the Zaller model allows to infer 
about the behavior of the message recipients; they react 
or ignore the message, depending on the relation 
between the message and their ability and experience. 
The same is true with respect of the Zaller-Deffuant 
model. A trivial example is when the warning about an 
emergency is announced in an unknown language; this 
warning will be ignored till the moment when unquiet 
behavior of local groups will be imitated by strangers. 
Less trivial is the conduct of children when alarm is 
heard in a school building; this signal will be probably 
interpreted by them with less attention than by teachers, 
who are responsible for their evacuation. 
 
   
 WHOM WE LIKE, WHOM WE FIGHT 
 
Another approach to be mentioned here deals with the 
problem of (Kulakowski and Gawronski 2009). It is 
motivated by the Prisoner's Dilemma, but is free from 
the parameters which describe payoffs. In this model, 
the probability that X cooperates with Y depends on the 
reputation of Y and the overall propensity (altruism) of 
X to cooperate. In various model variants, reputations 
and altruisms of agents vary or remain constant. 
Recently we could demonstrate, that an exclusion of 
agents with bad reputation does not undermine the 
social rate of cooperation (Jarynowski et al. 2012).  
Here again, an interpretation that cooperation is often 
limited to people with similar social status, seems 
natural (Weber 1978, p.932). We can make this 
conclusion more firm, using the concept of reciprocity 
(Fehr and Gachter 2000) ; people who do much better 
will not reciprocate my cooperation, because they are 
not afraid of my punishment; I will not reciprocate the 
cooperation of a poor for the same reason. Also, the 
numerical outcome can in principle be verified by a 
careful experiment.  
 
In this model, the connection between behavior and 
emotions is assured by the link between a cooperative 
behavior, a hope for reciprocity and the fear of 
punishment. The results reported in (Jarynowski et al. 
2012)   indicate, that once these emotions are absent, 
cooperation fails. A historical example is provided by 
the evacuation of American diplomats from Saigon in 
1975 (McNamara 1997), when the evacuees could not 
gain anything by cooperation with their Vietnamese 
allies. 
 
The description of the next model should be started 
from a reference to experiment. In 70's, Wayne Zachary 
investigated social relationships among 34 members of 
a karate club at an American university (Zachary 1977). 
Zachary wrote down these relationships as a 34x34 
connectivity matrix, indicating who had contacts with 
whom. During this research, a conflict appeared 
between the administrator and the teacher, and the club 
happened to divide into two groups. The matrix and the 
actual division (who with whom) entered to a data base, 
useful for social analysts. In particular, a simple set of 
nonlinear differential equations has been proposed to 
describe the time evolution of relations between agents 
(Kulakowski et al. 2005). The calculations – with the 
connectivity matrix as an input – exactly reproduced the 
division of the club.  
  
 
The driving mechanism was the attitude to remove the 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957); an emotional 
discomfort which we feel when some parts of our 
environment are mutually incoherent. In the case of the 
Zachary measurement, the discomfort experienced by 
the club members was related to their colleagues; some 
seemed to be more sympathetic, some less. These 
classifications were not mutually independent: the 
karatekas ordered their views according to the principle 
“friend of my enemy is my enemy” and the like. As a 
behavioral consequence, the club split appeared to be in 
accordance with their internal feelings. 
 
The examples given above provide an evidence that the 
inference from/to emotions and behavior is possible at 
the model level. In all these examples some kind of 
behavior (reaction for a message, cooperation, 
solidarity) was one of two options, and the adherence to 
this behavior was motivated by a definite mental state 
which also could appear or not appear. We note that in 
some social situations, a given emotion can be believed 
to appear without alternatives.  In this case, the aim of 
modeling is just to investigate consequences. A good 
example is the text (Malarz et al. 2006)  on the 
Bonabeau model   (Bonabeau et al. 1995); the latter was 
formulated with a reference to animal rather than human 
societies. Most briefly, the problem can be presented as 
follows. A group of agents wanders a given area, and 
those who met have to fight. The fight outcome is that 
the winner gets some goods from the loser. Also, the 
probability that an agent wins depends on his amount of 
goods before the fight. On the other hand, the 
differences between wealth of agents decrease between 
fights. The problem is, if the variance of wealth will be 
large or moderate? A phase transition between those 
two options was previously identified in the literature, 
and our text (Malarz et al. 2006) is devoted to an 
analysis of this phase transition. Perhaps the model 
could be an illustration of increasing differences in 
power between local rulers in medieval Europe. A 
beautiful and deep description of this process was given 
by Norbert Elias in his monumental book „The 
Civilization Process” (Elias 1939). However, we do not 
learn anything on human beings from the numerical 
results. The driving emotions, supposedly fear and hate 
between rivals, is built into the model without 
alternatives. 
 
FEELINGS IN CROWD 
 
When looking from this perspective, there is some 
analogy between the Bonabeau model and the modeling 
of crowd dynamics, as in the so-called Social Force 
Model (Helbing et al. 2000). There, pedestrians are 
represented as particles in a two-dimensional space, 
with appropriately chosen masses, radii, elastic and 
friction coefficients. We note that this careful design 
allowed to reach numerous interesting properties of the 
crowd, with undoubted accordance with reality  
(Johansson et al. 2007). The human nature of the 
simulated pedestrians manifests in that they prefer to 
keep mutual distance (hence „Social Force”) and in their 
ability to select direction and velocity of their motion. 
This characteristics can be enriched by an individual 
modification of their parameters or even by some 
manipulation of their purposes (Gawronski and 
Kulakowski 2011; Gawronski et al. 2012), but all that is 
to be done by hand.  
 
This list of our social modeling is to be compared with 
the research strategy applied in large scale by Treur and 
Sharpanskykh and their cooperators (Sharpanskykh 
2010; Bosse et al. 2011). The declared aim of the paper 
(Sharpanskykh 2010) is to define relations between 
different cognitive processes of an agent in a socio-
technical system. The list of these processes is derived 
from the literature. These are: belief revision, trust 
dynamics, generation and development of feelings and 
emotions, and decision making. Reading the text, we 
learn that the essence of work is to introduce the desired 
dependences of related variables by properly placed 
instructions of a specially designed computer language. 
In a section „Experiments”, three runs of the simulation 
of an evacuation are reported. As numerical results, 
three different curves are presented on the time 
dependence of the number of persons in the room.  
 
The paper (Bosse et al. 2011) reports a more direct 
connection to experimental data. Namely, the aim here 
is to reproduce the motion of people, filmed during the 
panic outbreak in Amsterdam, May 4, 2010. To achieve 
this, a total difference between filmed and calculated 
trajectories was minimized, tuning two global 
parameters and individual time dependences of the 
maximal speeds of people involved. This difference – a 
measure of the simulation error – was compared for 
three different cases: people did exchange emotions, 
people did not exchange emotions, people did not move 
at all. The exchange of emotions was built in to the 
general simulation frame, the same as in the previous 
paper (Sharpanskykh 2010). The first option gave the 
smallest error. In their conclusions, the authors 
underline this result as an argument that people do 
exchange emotions.  
 
We are tempted to suspect that it is the general, 
multidimensional frame used here what makes the 
contact with experimental data superficial. The 
conclusion that panicking people do exchange emotions 
is certainly reasonable. However, one can ask if this 
conclusion could not be obtained within a simpler 
model? Similarly to the Zaller approach, the general 
modeling frame used by Sharpanskykh and Treur does 
contain so many internal parameters of the simulated 
agents, that the abundance of these parameters disables 
any systematic analysis of their role.  
 
 
 
  
DISCUSSION  
 
Still, the issue becomes more complex when we realize 
that the multidimensional modeling could be defended 
as follows: if we fix all parameters but one, the obtained 
model should be formally equivalent to a model with 
one parameter. What is wrong with adding new 
parameters if we keep them constant? Perhaps a subtle 
but simple answer can be found in the prescription of 
modeling, given in  (Edmonds and Paolucci 2012) in a 
book review. The authors write: „To assess the 
usefulness of a modeling technique one has to look at 
the strength of three stages in the use of a model (...): 
(encoding) the map from the known or hypothesized 
facts and processes into the model set-up, (inference) 
the deduction of results from the set-up to the outcomes, 
and finally (decoding) the mapping of the results back 
to the phenomena of concern. Roughly, the usefulness 
of a model is the reliability of the whole modeling 
chain: encoding + inference + decoding.”  The answer 
could be that in multidimensional models, this reliability 
is particularly difficult to be controlled.  
 
The models brought up here as examples are different. 
The Zaller model of public opinion does not provide 
more insight, than the data it uses as an input; this is just 
a translation from the data to a set of coefficients, which 
can be measured only through these data. The bounded 
confidence model brings instead the concept of distance 
and one control parameter. One can wonder, if messages 
can be distributed in a geometrical space or rather on a 
network. Basically, we should be able to verify the 
Deffuant model by checking if the small world effect 
applies to the set of opinions; we imagine that this could 
be done by carefully designed interviews. Also, if the 
triangle inequality is broken in a given system, the 
whole concept of distance cannot be maintained. Taking 
this into account, we admit that the model assumptions 
are susceptible to a falsification; in terms of Wolfgang 
Pauli, this model can be right or wrong. 
 
In a reformulation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma multi-
agent game (Kulakowski and Gawronski 2009) a 
distribution of reputations of N agents about N others 
has been used. The essence of the model was to propose 
the rule of evolution of these reputations. We note that 
the reputations can be measured by interviews. 
Moreover, the aim of (Kulakowski and Gawronski 
2009) has not been to compare the results with a given 
set of data, but rather to check if cooperation without 
payoffs is possible. No fitting has been done there. 
Similarly, the differential equations used to simulate the 
removal of cognitive dissonance in (Kulakowski et al. 
2005) have been designed to illustrate the mechanism, 
and the accordance with experimental data of (Zachary 
1977) should be treated as to some extent fortuitous. No 
parameters have been fitted there. Advantages of simple 
models are commonly known (Edmonds 2000; 
Edmonds 2005). Yet, as is also known, their flaw is that 
the condition of simplicity drives these models far from 
reality. We perceive their role to be similar to the one of 
verbal syllogisms in ancient philosophy: they should 
improve the clarity of our thinking of social systems.  
 
The list of approaches presented above is limited to 
computational models, embedded in literature. It is 
worthwhile to mention also direct measurements of 
physiological variables which reflect emotional states of 
the subjects (Riener et al. 2009; Kashif et al. 2010). In 
some sense, however, the situation in these experiments 
mirrors the one in modeling. We expect that emotions 
are present in some situations, as when driving during 
the rush hours, we can even infer that a particularly 
risky strategy of driving, when observed, could be due 
to some specific mental state, but – more than often – 
the connection between behavior and emotions remains 
unverified. It is precisely the internal character of 
emotional states what makes the research of social 
systems  so complex. We suspect that these states 
influence the system behavior and almost always we are 
right. But more insight into this internal world cannot be 
attained without a dedicated research. The next step – 
what determines these emotions? – is related with past 
experience of our subjects, and therefore it is even more 
far. 
 
To summarize, either we can measure or at least 
evaluate our parameters, or the sensitivity analysis is 
necessary. In the case of internal parameters which can 
be measured only indirectly, the latter analysis seems 
unavoidable. Once stated, this rule seems trivial; yet 
sometimes the practice is different. In the social world 
of fluctuating parameters, an accordance of model 
predictions with a set of experimental data is often 
fortuitous. Therefore, on the contrary to natural 
sciences, it cannot be treated as the final proof of truth. 
The famous irony of John von Neumann “with four 
parameters I can fit an elephant, and with five I can 
make him wiggle his trunk” finds its target again. 
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